Abstract: Hwang, Lu and Lin (2003) proposed a (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme, based on the RSA cryptosystem. Later, Wang et al. (2004a) indicated that this scheme was insecure because the original signer's private key could be derived. Moreover, the delegates' identities had to be chosen carefully. In this paper, we propose an improved RSA-based (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme, which withstands this security flaw and also offers the convenience of choosing identities at will.
Introduction
proposed the concept of proxy signatures. These allow the original signer to delegate their signing capacity to another, the proxy signer. Employing the idea of secret sharing (Shamir, 1979; Pedersen, 1991a; Pedersen, 1991b; Kim, Part and Won, 1997; Zhang, 1997) presented the first threshold proxy signature schemes. In a (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme, the original signer delegates the signing capacity to n proxy signers (Huang and Chang 2003) . If more than (t-1) proxy signers cooperate, they can generate the valid signature on behalf of the original signer, who can set t freely such that 1 t n. Consequently, the threshold proxy signature scheme is more practical, flexible and secure than the conventional proxy signature scheme.
According to Hwang, Lu and Lin (2003) , the requirements of a practical and secure (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme include:
1 Secrecy: the original signer's private key cannot be derived.
2 Proxy Protection: no one can generate the valid partial proxy signature except the designated proxy signer.
3 Unforgeability: only if t or more proxy signers cooperate to generate a valid proxy signature.
4 Non-repudiation: proxy signers cannot deny signing the message, nor can the original signer deny delegating the capacity to the proxy signers.
5 Time Constraint: the proxy signing keys can only be used during the delegation period.
6 Known Signers: the actual signers of a given threshold proxy signature can be determined for an internal audit.
Although many threshold proxy signature schemes have been proposed (Kim, Part and Won, 1997; Zhang, 1997; Sun, 1999a; Sun, 1999b; Hwang, Lin and Lu, 2000; Hsu, Wu and Wu, 2001; Wang et al., 2004b) , most of them do not comply with all of the above requirements. All of these schemes are based on the discrete logarithm cryptosystems (ElGamal, 1985; Schnorr, 1991) because it is difficult to share the private key among multiple parties in the RSA cryptosystem (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, 1978) . Hwang, Lu and Lin (2003) proposed a (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem. They claimed that their scheme provides both computation and communication efficiencies. However, the proxy signer must choose their identity carefully, failing which the signer cannot generate the partial proxy signature successfully. This poses a limitation on the proxy signers because they cannot choose their own identities at will. Consequently, proxy signers may be forced to own a hard-toremember identity. Therefore, if the identities are not chosen carefully, the scheme will not work; the identities may need to be changed to satisfy the critical conditions of the scheme. This property makes the scheme impractical. Wang et al. (2004a) indicated that Hwang, Lu and Lin (2003) 's scheme is insecure and does not comply with all of the requirements. Moreover, the original signer's private key can be derived when t proxy signers cooperate. When the threshold t is not very large, it is quite dangerous, placing a heavier burden on choosing the identities. For these reasons, we propose an improved RSA-based (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme with free-will identities.
In Section 2, we review Hwang Lu and Lin (2003)'s (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme and Wang et al. (2004a) 's critique of it. Our proposed scheme is presented in Section 3, followed by the discussion in Section 4. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section 5. Hwang, Lu and Lin (2003) 's (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme consists of three phases: proxy sharing, proxy signature issuing and verification. The scheme is initiated as follows. Let S 0 denote the original signer, and S 1 , S 2 ,…, S n denote n proxy signers. Let N i , which is identical to p i *q i , be a public RSA modulus for S i , where p i and q i are two secret large primes with i = 0, 1,…, n. S i owns a private key d i , a public key e i and the identity ID i , where gcd[e i , (N i )] = 1 and d i *e i = 1 mod (N i ), Let w, which is a warrant minted by S 0 , include important information such as the validity period of the proxy key, the proxy signers' identities, the original signer and so on. T denotes the proxy signature group, where
A review of Hwang, Lu and Lin (2003)'s t-out-of-n proxy signature scheme
T = {S 1 , S 2 ,…, S n }. Let , , /( ) i j i j i j S S T i j L ID ID ID , where L i Z, for i = 1, 2,…, n.
The proxy sharing phase
S 0 delegates the signing power to n people, S 1 , S 2 ,…, S n , as follows:
Step 1 Step 2: S 0 generates a secret polynomial f of degree (t 1), where f(x) = D + r 1 x + r 2 x 2 + … + r t 1 x t 1 mod (N 0 ), where r 1 , r 2 ,…, r t 1 are t 1 random numbers. S 0 computes S i 's partial proxy signing key k i = f(ID i ), and sends
Step 3: After receiving the transmitted data, S i computes
The proxy signature issuing phase
When t members of T want to sign a message M cooperatively on behalf of S 0 , they do so as follows:
Step 1: Each member from the set of the t members computes
x N is computed and the result with x i is sent to the combiner.
Step 2: The combiner verifies each x i with the corresponding proxy signer's public key, collects each mod
x N , and then computes the proxy signature S of M, where
The verification phase
A verifier V who wants to verify the proxy signature executes the following procedure:
Step 1: V first checks whether (w || E) =
. If it holds, V checks the validity period. If the period has expired, it indicates that the proxy verification key is invalid; otherwise, the phase continues.
Step 2: V computes S E mod N 0 and checks if the computation result is equal to M.
Step 3: The collected ( mod
x N ) can be employed to identify the actual signer.
Security flaw in Hwang, Lu and Lin (2003)'s RSA-based (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme
Here, we demonstrate how to retrieve S 0 's private key (Wang et al., 2004a) . Assume t members of T cooperate to retrieve S 0 's private key, as follows:
Step 1: The members compute D = D mod (N 0 ) cooperatively without knowing (N 0 ).
Step 2:
, where b is an integer.
Step 3: If gcd(e 0 , P) = c 1, P = P/c go to Step 3; if gcd(e 0 , P)=1, d 0 can be obtained such that e 0 *d 0 = 1 mod P, where b is an integer, P = b * (N 0 ), and b |b. 3 The proposed t-RSA-based out-of-n proxy signature scheme
The proposed (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme also consists of three phases: proxy sharing, proxy signature issuing and verification. The initiation of the proposed scheme is similar to Hwang, Lu and Lin (2003) 's scheme with the following differences:
, where i = 1, 2,…, n.
2 C is a trusted third party with the RSA public key (N c , e c ) and the RSA private key d c , where N c is larger than any proxy signer S i 's public key N i and S 0 's public key N 0 .
3 h(): a public one-way collision-resistant hash function.
The proxy sharing phase
S 0 delegates the power to sign messages to n people as follows:
Step 1: S 0 computes k N k is greater than N i , it will be divided into two or more items such that each item is smaller than N i , and each item is encrypted by S i 's public key separately.
Step 3 
The proxy signature issuing phase
For t members of T to sign a message M cooperatively on behalf of S 0 :
Step 1: Each member computes mod N c is sent to C by each member. If g i is greater than N c , it will be divided into two or more items (g i 's) such that each g i is smaller than N c , and each item is encrypted by C's public key separately.
Step 2: C first uses his/her private key d c to get g i , verifies x i with the corresponding proxy signer's public key, collects each x i and g i , and computes the proxy signature S of M, where
The verification phase
Step 1: V first checks if (w || E) = . If it holds, V checks the validity period. If the period has expired, it denotes that the proxy verification key is invalid; otherwise, the phase continues.
V verifies M by checking whether the computation results are equal or not.
Step 3: If there is a need to identify the actual signers, the collected g i 's can be used.
Discussion
The following section demonstrates the security of the proposed scheme -how the proxy signer can choose his/her own identity at will and how the scheme satisfies the six requirements mentioned in Section 1. In sub-section 4.3, practices for managers are recommended
Proxy signer can choose his/her own identity at will
in our proposed scheme. Because N 0 is known, (ID j -ID i ) -1 mod N 0 can be obtained. That is, irrespective of the identities, L i must be an integer. As a result, proxy signers can choose their own identities at will.
Security of the scheme
The clerk C is trusted in the scheme. Therefore, the partial signature must be concealed such that only C can reveal it to combine all the collected partial signatures. As shown in
Step 1 of sub-section 3.2, the partial signature g i is encrypted by C's public key and so only C can access it. As shown in sub-section 3.3, the validity of the generated proxy signature is ensured. If a proxy signer denies signing the signature, the partial signature g i can be employed because g i = ( || || ( || )) mod . Even if D is retrieved, the signed partial proxy signature g i, for determining the real proxy signers cannot be generated, since the proxy signer's private key is unknown.
The following section discusses how our proposed scheme satisfies the six basic requirements mentioned in Section 1.
Secrecy -the original signer's private key cannot be derived
As shown in sub-section 4.2, because D and E are the products with the moduli N 0 and (N 0 ), respectively, no information of (N 0 ) will be known even if D is retrieved. Moreover, 
Proxy protection -no one can generate the valid partial proxy signature except the delegated proxy signer
As shown in sub-section 3.2, the proxy signer S i 's partial signature
Only S i can generate the valid partial proxy signature because S i 's private key d i is unknown.
Unforgeability--only if t or more proxy signers cooperate, a valid proxy signature can be created
As shown in sub-section 3.2, if t or more proxy signers cooperate, C can get D to generate the valid proxy signature. 
Proxy signers cannot deny that they

Time constraint -the proxy signing keys can be used during the delegation period.
As shown in sub-section 3.1, S 0 computes 
Known signers -for internal audit, the actual signers of a given threshold
proxy signature can be determined.
Only S i can generate the valid partial proxy signature. Therefore, C can use the collected partial signatures g i 's to prove who the real signer is.
Recommended practices for managers
RSA cryptosystems are used globally, and the RSA public key infrastructure are well established. Thus, plenty of applications involving public keys are based on RSA; for example digital signature, certificates and key agreement. Digital signature is the most common application because it provides authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. They can be realistically applied to e-commerce and official documents, such as e-checks and e-invoices. All important documents apply digital signatures to make them unforgeable. An important application for official documents is the proxy signature. For example one department manager alone may not be able to manage the entire department and thus delegate the responsibility to other manager(s). The threshold proxy signature is designed for such a scenario. The proposed RSA proxy signature scheme adopts the wellestablished RSA cryptosystem instead of the discrete logarithm-based cryptosystem. This allows the organisation or company that wants to apply proxy signatures to authorise others to develop the customer-specific proxy signature system realistically.
Conclusion
In this paper, we remedy the flaws of Hwang, Lu and Lin (2003) 's (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme. As mentioned above, our proposed scheme can withstand the security flaws of the earlier scheme. Moreover, it offers the convenience of choosing the identities at will. Consequently, our proposed scheme is not only secure but also practical.
